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THE CALIFORNIA GREENHOUSE GAS
WAIVER DECISION AND AGENCY
INTERPRETATION: A RESPONSE TO
PROFESSORS GALLE AND SEIDENFELD
NINA A. MENDELSON†
INTRODUCTION
Professors Brian Galle and Mark Seidenfeld add some important
strands to the debate on agency preemption, particularly in their
detailed documentation of the potential advantages agencies may
possess in deliberating on preemption compared with Congress and
1
2
the courts. As they note, the quality of agency deliberation matters
to two different debates. First, should an agency interpretation of
statutory language to preempt state law receive Chevron deference in
the courts, as other agency interpretations may, or should some lesser
form of deference be given? Second, should a general statutory
authorization to an agency to administer a program and to issue rules
be read broadly to include the authority to declare state law
preempted if the agency views that as an appropriate way to
implement the program? (I have previously argued for both limited
3
deference and a presumption against agency preemption. )

Copyright © 2008 by Nina A. Mendelson. Noncommercial copying of this work is licensed
under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial License, as long as the licensee
notes the author’s name, title, and that the work was first published in the Duke Law Journal.
To view a copy of this license, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/3.0 or send a letter
to Creative Commons, 171 Second St., Suite 300, San Francisco, CA 94105 USA.
† Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. I am grateful to the other
symposium participants, Professors Stuart Benjamin, Brian Galle, Gillian Metzger, Mark
Seidenfeld, and Ernest Young, for a lively and helpful discussion of the issues, and to the Duke
Law Journal for the opportunity to participate in the Symposium.
1. Brian Galle & Mark Seidenfeld, Administrative Law’s Federalism: Preemption,
Delegation, and Agencies at the Edge of Federal Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 1933, 1948–85 (2008).
2. See id. at 1943.
3. See Nina A. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, 102 MICH. L. REV. 737, 797–98
(2004) [hereinafter Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption]; Nina A. Mendelson, A Presumption
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Galle and Seidenfeld argue for the superiority of agency
decisionmaking because, as a formal matter, it may be comparatively
4
transparent and accountable. An agency, unlike Congress, must
comply with notice and comment requirements, at least for
rulemaking, and must explain its reasons for taking an action on
5
judicial review. Galle and Seidenfeld suggest that agency preemption
decisions might be even better reasoned if the judiciary engaged in a
6
harder “hard look” on judicial review. As a preliminary matter, I
want to point out that the level of agreement among commentators
writing in this area is striking. Professors Galle, Seidenfeld, Catherine
Sharkey, Thomas Merrill, and I all agree that agencies should not be
7
categorically prohibited from preempting state law. We agree further
that agencies have valuable information to offer about how a
particular federal program functions, the issues it is designed to
address, and how regulated entities may fare if faced with multiple
8
standards. Finally, however—and despite Galle and Seidenfeld’s
claims on behalf of agency decisionmaking—we apparently also agree
that more controls are needed on agency interpretations that preempt
9
10
state law than can be provided by the Chevron doctrine alone.
Under that doctrine, courts uphold a “reasonable” agency

Against Agency Preemption, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 695, 706–24 (2008) [hereinafter Mendelson,
Presumption].
4. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1949–61 (transparency); id. at 1979–85
(accountability).
5. Id. at 1956.
6. Id. at 2001–02. The judicial “hard look” refers to review applying the Administrative
Procedure Act’s “arbitrary and capricious” review standard. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2006)
(requiring courts to set aside agency actions, findings, and conclusions if courts find them to be
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law”).
7. Professor Merrill has opposed Chevron deference in his amicus brief filed in Watters v.
Wachovia. Brief of the Center for State Enforcement of Antitrust and Consumer Protection
Laws, Inc. as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner at 6–8, 16–19, Watters v. Wachovia Bank,
N.A. 127 S. Ct. 1559 (2006) (No. 05-1342), 2006 WL 2570991. He argues, however, that an
agency could properly receive a delegation to preempt state law if Congress expressly
authorized the agency to do so. Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and Institutional Choice, 102
NW. U. L. REV. 727, 767 (2008). Professor Sharkey has advocated Skidmore deference in her
piece, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449,
492–93 (2008).
8. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1971–74; Thomas W. Merrill, Preemption and
Institutional Choice, 102 NW. U. L. REV. 727, 755–56 (2008); Sharkey, supra note 7, at 485–90.
9. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984).
10. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1999 (“We doubt Chevron is flexible enough to
capture all the nuances of our test.”); Merrill, supra note 8, at 775 (arguing for Skidmore rather
than Chevron deference); Sharkey, supra note 7, at 491–98 (same).
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11

interpretation of ambiguous statutory language. No one wants to
give away the store here.
Professor Sharkey and I both recommend a Skidmore deference
standard for agency preemption decisions (and I also advocate for a
presumption against reading a statute to grant an agency the power to
12
preempt state law). Under the Skidmore standard, agency
interpretations receive a measure of deference, but one weaker than
Chevron deference, that depends on whether the court finds the
13
agency’s reasoning persuasive. Despite their lengthy defense of
agency preemption processes, Professors Galle and Seidenfeld
ultimately take only a modified version of this position, because they
advocate enhanced judicial review of agency reasoning on state law
preemption that bears a strong resemblance to the sort of review
14
courts conduct using Skidmore.
So, at least about the bottom line, we do not disagree about very
much. Yet, given the arguments they make, why do Professors Galle
and Seidenfeld hesitate as much as they do about deferring even
more to agencies? Their hesitation stems, I suggest, from the fact that
even good procedures and judicial review may not be sufficient for
agencies to properly consider the range of issues, including federalism
values, that should be part of a state law preemption decision. A 2008
agency decision on preemption is an excellent case in point—the
EPA’s interpretation of Clean Air Act Section 209(a) in its decision
finding California preempted from regulating automobile greenhouse
15
gas emissions. The EPA’s interpretation of statutory language on
preemption failed to consider important relevant issues. These issues,

11. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 843–44 (1984).
12. See Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 3, at 797–98; Sharkey, supra note
7, at 492–93.
13. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944) (holding that an agency
interpretation may receive deference depending upon the “thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade”).
14. They advocate “an amalgam of Skidmore and hard-look review.” See Galle &
Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 2001–02. Their only apparent hesitation about Skidmore review is
that because of the doctrine of stare decisis, it seems to limit an agency’s flexibility to change its
mind. Id. at 2000–01; see also, e.g., United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 247 (2001) (Scalia,
J., dissenting) (arguing that a Skidmore approach will lead to “ossification” of statutory law).
On the other hand, this seems to present the greatest problem when the Supreme Court has
spoken. For example, a court of appeals may revisit precedent or disagree with another
appellate court. Moreover, an agency can seek a legislative amendment from Congress.
15. See discussion infra Part II.

04__MENDELSON.DOC

2160

11/14/2008 9:26:39 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:2157
16

which Galle and Seidenfeld term “abstract federalism,” include the
extent to which preservation of state autonomy can lead to more
national dialogue and experimentation on policies and
counterbalance federal authority.
What explains this? In my view, the ability of agencies to
deliberate on preemption suffers from distinctive limitations that
Galle and Seidenfeld do not adequately consider. I discuss two such
shortcomings. First, as I have elsewhere argued, agencies lack
expertise in federalism values that can figure in state law preemption
questions. As with the EPA’s decision on the California greenhouse
gas regulations, agencies show a consistent unwillingness to take these
issues into account.
Second, a federal agency with a policy in hand would seem
comparatively unlikely to concede the need for further
experimentation or policy development by other governments.
Professors Galle and Seidenfeld argue that enhanced judicial review
might prompt better analysis of these issues. Under current law,
however, judicial review of agency decisionmaking may have the
contrary incentive, instead deterring agencies from considering
abstract federalism concerns. Accordingly, judges should not
presumptively defer to agency decisions in this area.
THE EPA’S DECISION ON CALIFORNIA
AUTOMOBILE GREENHOUSE GAS EMISSIONS
The authority to set emissions standards for automobiles is
primarily federal, and states are generally preempted from setting
17
their own tailpipe standards. By statute, however, preemption of
state law is not complete. Under Clean Air Act Section 209(b), the
EPA administrator “shall” grant a waiver of preemption to California
for state standards that are at least as protective of public health and
18
welfare as the federal standards. The section provides three
19
exceptions that might justify a waiver denial. Most importantly, the
administrator must deny a waiver of preemption if the administrator
finds that “such State does not need such State standards to meet
16. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 2012.
17. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a) (2000) (“No State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt
or attempt to enforce any standard relating to the control of emissions from new motor
vehicles . . . .”) (this section is commonly referred to as Clean Air Act § 209(a)).
18. Id. § 7543(b).
19. Id.
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20

compelling and extraordinary conditions.” The EPA has considered
over fifty waiver applications and apparently has granted most, if not
21
all, to date.
California’s leadership in regulating automotive air pollution is
well recognized. According to the Congressional Research Service,
California’s regulation has served to demonstrate “cutting edge
emission control technologies,” including, among other things,
22
catalytic converters and cleaner fuels.
In response to global warming concerns, California’s legislature
mandated the first-ever greenhouse gas standards for automobiles in
2002; regulations were promulgated in 2004, and California filed a
petition for waiver of preemption with the EPA on December 21,
23
2005. The Clean Air Act permits other states to elect to follow
24
California standards in lieu of federal standards, and sixteen states
have indicated their intent to adopt the California greenhouse gas
25
standards.
26
The EPA took two full years to decide the petition. Keeping a
commitment to California Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger that it
27
would render a decision by the end of 2007, the EPA declared in
28
December 2007 that it would deny the petition. The EPA issued the

20. Id. § 7543(b)(1).
21. Since 1967, when the preemption and preemption waiver provisions were adopted,
California has submitted and EPA has granted over fifty waivers of preemption in compliance
with statutory terms. JAMES E. MCCARTHY & ROBERT MELTZ, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
CALIFORNIA’S WAIVER REQUEST TO CONTROL GREENHOUSE GASES UNDER THE CLEAN AIR
ACT 2 (2007), available at http://www.azclimatechange.gov/download/082007.pdf.
22. Id.
23. Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156, 12,157
(Mar. 6, 2008).
24. See 42 U.S.C. § 7507.
25. See Pew Center on Global Climate Change, Vehicle Greenhouse Gas Emissions
Standards, http://www.pewclimate.org/what_s_being_done/in_the_states/vehicle_ghg_standard.
cfm (last visited May 31, 2008).
26. The EPA initially took the position that decision on the waiver petition would be
inappropriate prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, 127 S. Ct 1438
(2007). Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. at 12,157. In
Massachusetts, the EPA argued that greenhouse gases were not “air pollutants” within the
meaning of the Clean Air Act. Massachusetts, 127 S. Ct., at 1450. In April 2007, the Supreme
Court rejected the EPA’s arguments. See id. 1462.
27. Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. at 12,157.
28. Id.
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supporting opinion in February 2008, and it was published in the
29
Federal Register on March 6, 2008.
That decision is notable because, to carry out its statutory
responsibility to decide the petition, the EPA had to offer an
interpretation of the scope of Section 209(b)(1)(B) of the Clean Air
Act. That section says that no waiver can be granted “if the
Administrator finds . . . that such State does not need such State
30
standards to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions.” The
EPA construed this waiver exception to mean that the California
standards at issue must be aimed at addressing a distinctively local
31
problem. Otherwise, the EPA reasoned, the waiver must be denied
32
and the California standards preempted by federal law. The EPA
then applied the standard and found that the California standards did
not meet the requirement because greenhouse gases represent global
33
causes of a global problem of warming. Even if warming might
worsen California’s local air pollution problems, the agency reasoned,
greenhouse gases causing that warming might come from anywhere
and so must be addressed through a national approach, rather than
34
locally.
Whatever answer the agency might have offered to the
interpretive question, a thorough examination of it raises all the sorts
of issues Professors Galle and Seidenfeld would predict. One would
expect an expert interpreter of the scope of the waiver provisions to
consider not only congressional intent reflected in the language, but
also purposive issues. These would include the statutory goal of
protecting air quality; concern with the cost of implementing multiple
standards; and the value of some state regulatory autonomy to
address local concerns, to experiment with policy, and to
35
counterbalance federal authority.
Professors Galle and Seidenfeld suggest that normally this is the
sort of job an agency should be able to undertake: “[A]gencies are
well suited for evaluating the benefits of both localism and the need
29. See id. at 12,156–57.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1)(B) (2000).
31. Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. at 12,160.
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. See id. at 12,162–63.
35. See Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 3, at 756–57 (summarizing
federalism concerns that might be supported by a presumption against preemption).
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for experimentation within the programs they regulate . . . [including]
the extent of problems with all existing regulatory paradigms that
might warrant using states as laboratories to develop new
36
approaches.”
One might see the California waiver as a sort of test case for
their arguments. Given the existing controversies about how to
regulate climate change, coupled with California’s past leadership on
automotive air emissions, this is the sort of case in which an agency
ought to be well suited at least to consider (if not ultimately to place
dispositive weight upon) the “problems with . . . existing regulatory
paradigms” and thus the value of state policy experimentation.
Moreover, four features of the California waiver decision process
make it a particularly good test case for Professors Galle and
Seidenfeld’s views. Because of the formal procedural advantages of
rulemaking, Galle and Seidenfeld would like to see agencies take
37
positions on preemption through rulemaking. Admittedly, the
decision on California’s waiver petition is not a “rule” and thus was
not made through “rulemaking.” Nonetheless, in nearly all relevant
procedural respects, the decision resembled a rulemaking, and a
highly visible one at that.
38
39
First, the EPA held public hearings, as required by statute,
40
and, as with rulemaking, conducted a notice and comment process.
As Administrator Stephen Johnson explained in his decision letter to
Governor Schwarzenegger,
As you know, EPA undertook an extensive public notice and
comment process with regard to the waiver request. The Agency
held two public hearings: one on May 22, 2007 in Washington, D.C.
and one in Sacramento, California on May 30, 2007. We heard from
over 80 individuals at these hearings and received thousands of
written comments during the ensuing public comment process from
parties representing a broad set of interests, including state and local

36. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1977.
37. See id. at 2011 (“This suggests that the agency should displace state law only by clearly
stated legislative rules.”).
38. Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. at 12,157.
39. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1) (2000) (requiring “notice and opportunity for public
hearing” prior to decision on a waiver application).
40. Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. at 12,157. This, and
other procedural requirements for rulemaking, are detailed in 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).

04__MENDELSON.DOC

2164

11/14/2008 9:26:39 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 57:2157

governments, public health and environmental organizations,
academia, industry and citizens. The Agency also received and
considered a substantial amount of technical and scientific material
submitted after the close of the comment deadline on June 15,
2007.41

Second, the EPA’s decision is subject to judicial review, as a rule
42
would be, under the arbitrary and capricious standard. Third, though
Office of Management and Budget clearance was not required for this
43
decision, EPA officials reportedly consulted with the White House
44
on the decision anyway. Fourth, given the amount of press coverage
and congressional attention given to the December 2007
45
announcement of denial, not to mention California’s immediate
46
filing of a lawsuit challenging the denial, the EPA could reasonably

41. Letter from Stephen Johnson, EPA Administrator, to Arnold Schwarzenegger,
Governor of Cal. (Dec. 19, 2007), available at http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/20071219-slj.pdf.
42. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (stating that judicial review standards for agency action
include review to confirm that the action is not “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or
otherwise not in accordance with law”). One requirement applicable to rulemaking would not
seem to apply here: an obligation to respond to “significant comments” that courts have
imposed as a gloss on Section 553 of the APA. E.g., United States v. Nova Scotia Food Prods.
Corp., 568 F.2d 240, 249–50 (2d Cir. 1977) (“We think that to sanction silence in the face of such
vital questions [raised in the comments] would be to make the statutory requirement of a
“concise general statement” less than an adequate safeguard against arbitrary decisionmaking.); Am. Mining Cong. v. EPA, 965 F.2d 759, 771 (9th Cir. 1992). Nonetheless, the other
environmental features of the decision should have given EPA ample incentive to engage all
relevant arguments.
43. See Exec. Order No. 13,422, 72 Fed Reg. 2,763 (Jan. 18, 2007); Exec. Order No. 12,866,
3 C.F.R. 638 (1993), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 (2006) (requiring Office of Management and
Budget clearance only of agency rules).
44. A March 2008 Senate appropriations committee hearing transcript contained the
following colloquy between California Senator Dianne Feinstein and EPA Administrator
Stephen Johnson:
FEINSTEIN: Did you discuss it with the White House?
JOHNSON: As I have said in previous testimonies, yes, I discuss major issues with
the White House. I think that’s good government. I discussed it with my colleagues
across the administration. But again, the decision, the final decision rests with me and
I made the decision . . . .
Fiscal Year 2009 Budget for the EPA: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Interior, Environmental,
and Related Agencies of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 110th Cong. (Mar. 4, 2008), 2008 WL
607187.
45. E.g., John M. Broder & Felicity Barringer, E.P.A. Says 17 States Can’t Set Emission
Rules, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/20/washington/20epa.
html?_r=1&oref=slogin; Alex Kaplun, Senate Panel to Probe Decision on Calif. Waiver,
GREENWIRE, Dec. 21, 2007 (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
46. See Alex Kaplun, Calif., Groups Sue EPA Over Waiver Decision, GREENWIRE, Jan. 2,
2008 (on file with the Duke Law Journal).
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expect a high degree of public accountability. The EPA could
anticipate that the opinion explaining the denial would slip beneath
no one’s radar screen. And indeed, immediately after the EPA issued
the opinion supporting the waiver denial, EPA Administrator
47
Johnson was questioned in Congress regarding the decision.
Despite these seemingly optimal conditions for deliberation, the
EPA’s consideration of abstract federalism concerns was inadequate.
The EPA interpreted the statute to require preemption of California
standards unless the standards address “compelling and
extraordinary” local air pollution conditions, in which the causes, too,
48
are “local to California.”
Again, my focus here is not on the result, but on the analysis the
EPA used to get there. The EPA’s opinion largely focused on what it
believed Congress intended in enacting the words “compelling and
49
extraordinary.” The Administrator’s opinion stated in relevant part,
I believe that . . . . Section 209(b) was a compromise measure that
allowed disruption of the introduction of new motor vehicles into
interstate commerce by allowing California to have its own motor
vehicle program, but limited this to situations where the air
pollution problems have their basic cause, and therefore their
solution, locally in California.50

Interestingly, the EPA opinion contained no discussion of the
practical implications of its interpretation, either for automobile
manufacturers or for the environment. Instead, it reads primarily as
an exercise in pure statutory interpretation.
In that vein, even in a case that very clearly raised the value of
state experimentation given California’s history of regulating air
pollution, the EPA did not discuss this core federalism value. The
opinion did not consider the value of permitting California to
continue to serve as a “laboratory” in developing climate change
policies. Discussing this issue would have been appropriate in light of
47. Administrator Johnson was questioned in appropriations hearings, as well as in other
settings. E.g., Fiscal Year 2009 Budget for the EPA, supra note 44; Fiscal Year 2009 Budget for
the EPA: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Interior, Environmental, and Related Agencies of the
S. Comm. on Appropriations, 110th Cong. (Feb. 26, 2008), 2008 WL 526941.
48. See Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156, 12,163
(Mar. 6, 2008).
49. See id.
50. Id.; see also id. (discussing “the unique problems faced in California as a result of its
climate and topography” (citing H.R. REP. NO. 90-728, at 21 (1967)).
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the statute’s silence on whether “compelling and extraordinary”
issues were to be local, in light of the legislative history, and, for that
51
matter, in light of the arguments made to the EPA.
To be fair, the EPA’s analysis did consider the value of
52
California’s ability to respond to local concerns. In that respect, it is
something of an improvement over other agency preemption
decisions. For example, the opinion explicitly considered the value of
California being able to address its distinctively local air pollution
53
problems.
The EPA’s failure, however, to consider the value of state policy
experimentation in this best case scenario is consistent with my earlier
documentation of agency failure to consider these values. In Chevron
and Preemption, I have documented agency failures to comply with
the “federalism impact statement” requirements of Executive Order
54
13,132. In A Presumption Against Agency Preemption, I updated this
research and also examined several examples of agency preemption
55
declarations. The EPA’s failure in the California greenhouse gas
waiver denial to thoroughly examine what Professors Galle and
56
Seidenfeld term “abstract federalism” issues is typical of past agency
interpretations. I argued in those articles that this failure is largely a
57
function of lack of agency expertise.
I agree with Professors Galle and Seidenfeld, however, that the
analysis cannot simply be a critique of agency capabilities without

51. The EPA opinion did, a few pages earlier, note that “part of [the] benefit” to California
of the 209(b) waiver was to allow the state to serve as a “laboratory for potential federal motor
vehicle controls.” Id. at 12,162. In simply mentioning this issue, the EPA opinion represents a
substantial advance over most other agency actions relating to the extent of state law
preemption. See, e.g., Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 3, at 784 (describing
other examples of agency preemption discussions); Mendelson, Presumption, supra note 3, at
718–32 & nn 122–30. It may be that agencies will eventually develop some consistent expertise
on these questions. For this potential to be fully realized, however, legislation is required. See
infra text accompanying note 81 (arguing that statutory criteria are required to guide both
agencies and reviewing judges). Ultimately, however, this issue appeared to play no role
whatsoever in the EPA’s reasoning. Indeed, that sentence could have been omitted from the
opinion, while making no difference at all either to the analysis or to the outcome.
52. Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,159–60.
53. Id. at 12,162.
54. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 3, at 783–86.
55. Mendelson, Presumption, supra note 3, at 719–21.
56. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 2012.
57. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 3, at 780–82; Mendelson,
Presumption, supra note 3, at 718.
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considering how agencies stack up against other institutions. I have
elsewhere considered, in more general terms, judicial expertise on
58
federalism concerns.
And how does the EPA’s discussion on this issue of “abstract
federalism” compare with that of Congress? In a word, poorly. When
Congress enacted the Air Quality Act of 1967, including Section 209
of the Clean Air Act, both House and Senate committee reports
discussing the question of preemption considered the value of
uniform national standards in addition to California’s need to
respond to local conditions, its status as a leader in regulating air
pollution, and the value to the country of California’s “policy
experiments.” The House Report, for example, contained discussion
of the need for uniformity: “The ability of those engaged in the
manufacture of automobiles to obtain clear and consistent answers
concerning emission controls and standards is of considerable
59
importance so as to permit economies in production.” It also
considered “the unique problems facing California as a result of its
60
climate and topography,” and the value to the entire country of the
state’s leadership and its service as a model for regulating air
61
pollution. Similarly, the Senate Committee Report focused on
California’s “unique problems and pioneering efforts,” and stated,
The Nation will have the benefit of California’s experience with
lower standards which will require new control systems and design.
In fact California will continue to be the testing area for such lower
standards. . . [and if successful] it is expected that the Secretary
will . . . give serious consideration to strengthening the Federal
standards.62

Both committees discussed these federalism issues although they
arrived at different conclusions. The Senate committee adopted a
version of the preemption provisions closer to their current form—
allowing California to draft the standards, subject to an EPA waiver
63
determination. The House committee, however, reported a bill with

58. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 3, at 787–88.
59. H.R. REP. NO. 90-728, at 21 (1967).
60. Id. at 22.
61. Id. at 96 (separate statement Mssrs. John E. Moss & Lionel Van Deerlin) (“California
has led the Nation in promulgating strict emission control requirements . . . .”); id. (“California
has been a model for the Nation in this critical field.”).
62. S. REP. NO. 90-403, at 33 (1967).
63. See id.
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no role preserved for California—instead, the bill authorized the
64
federal government to set special standards for California.
In 1977, similar strains appeared in congressional discussions on
amendments to the Clean Air Act. The House Report explained
Section 209 with reference both to local issues and California’s service
as an example to the rest of the country: “California was afforded
special status due to that State’s pioneering role in regulating
automobile-related emissions, which pre-dated the Federal effort. In
addition, California’s air pollution problem was then, and still appears
65
to be, among the most pervasive and acute in the Nation.”
In oversight hearings in 2007 and 2008, discussion among
members of Congress has included consideration of these abstract
federalism issues. In March 2008, during EPA budget hearings in the
Senate, for example, a number of Senators commented on the states’
rights issues raised by the EPA’s treatment of the California waiver
66
petition. In House of Representatives hearings in November 2007
and February 2008, members of Congress mentioned the value of
states as “laboratories of democracy, the places where innovative
67
solutions to the nation’s challenges are developed,” as well as
expressing concern with the EPA stopping states from leading the
68
nation on difficult policy questions. In January 2008 Senate hearings
on climate change policy, in questioning a top administration official
on its climate change policies compared with those of the states,
another Senator observed the value of the “whole concept of

64. H.R. REP. NO. 90-728, at 9.
65. H.R. REP. NO. 95-294, at 301 (1977).
66. See Fiscal Year 2009 Budget for the EPA: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Interior,
Environmental, and Related Agencies of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 110th Cong. (2008),
2008 WL 607187 (statement of Sen. Allard) (“I do not necessarily agree on all aspects of the
greenhouse debate, but . . . . I’m also troubled by the suggestion that the state of California’s
rights may have been curtailed.”); id. (statement of Sen. Feinstein) (“I mean, it seems to me if
Congress intended for waivers to be limited to problems unique to California, why did it give
other states the right to adopt the same standards?”).
67. State Efforts Toward Low-Carbon Energy: Hearing Before the H. Select Comm. on
Energy Independence and Global Warming, 110th Cong. (2007), 2007 WL 3389741 (statement of
Rep. Markey); see also id. (statement of Rep. McCollum) (“We have California, Wyoming,
Washington, and the northern states coming up with creative ideas.”).
68. Hearing on the EPA Before the Subcomm. on Interior, Environmental, and Related
Agencies of the H. Comm. on Appropriations, 110th Cong. (2008), 2008 WL 526941 (statement
of Rep. Moran) (“I was stunned that—where I would think that EPA would be encouraging
state and local efforts. You pulled the rug out from under California, which was attempting to
show the lead, because of the lack of leadership on the federal government’s part.”).
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federalism. We can learn in the [process] of doing.” In short,
congressional deliberations on state law preemption seem clearly
superior to those of the EPA, despite the advantages of procedural
rigor and greater transparency Professors Galle and Seidenfeld would
claim for the agency.
So, why did the EPA not do a better job? It is impossible to
know for sure, but procedural irregularities can be ruled out given the
extensive process that accompanied the decision. Similarly, lack of
political accountability likely also can be ruled out given the apparent
70
(though informal) White House involvement. For purposes of this
discussion, I also assume the agency was not captured by rent-seeking
interest groups or otherwise malfunctioning dramatically. Although a
contrary assumption could, in theory, explain the outcome, there is
71
little reason to think it would explain the quality of analysis.
I suggest two possible explanations for the agency’s
impoverished exploration of abstract federalism issues. First, as I
have argued in greater detail elsewhere, assessing the abstract issues
implicated in the distribution of federal and state power is not
typically within the core expertise of a federal regulatory agency.72
The EPA is a specialized institution focused, in the setting of the
Clean Air Act, on how best to protect health and the environment by
regulating air pollution. Implementing that act only raises some of the
many questions relevant to preemption, such as interstate issues and
the burdens upon regulated entities that must comply with multiple
standards. Congress has given the agency no specific guidance on how
to interpret Clean Air Act preemption language. As the EPA itself
notes, past waiver decisions have been far more cursory in analyzing
73
the scope of this statutory language.

69 Climate Change: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 110th Cong. (2008)
(statement of Sen. Cardin), 2008 WL 219099.
70 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
71 Capture could, of course, explain the result here. I have elsewhere argued that if one
accepts a public choice view of agency regulation, state law preemption can allow an agency to
more effectively “deliver on ‘deals’ with well-organized interest groups.” Mendelson, Chevron
and Preemption, supra note 3, at 795.
72 See id. at 779-91.
73 See Notice of Decision Denying a Waiver of Clean Air Act Preemption for California’s
Greenhouse Gas Emission Standards for New Motor Vehicles, 73 Fed. Reg. 12,156, 12,159
(Mar. 6, 2008) (“EPA’s review of this criterion has typically been cursory due to California
needing its motor vehicle emission program due to fundamental factors leading to local and
regional air pollution problems (as discussed below).”). For an example of the EPA’s cursory
review, see California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards; Waiver of Federal
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Further, job postings at the EPA as of this writing, for program
analysts and senior program officials, seek candidates with expertise
in relevant environmental laws rather than on broader issues of
74
governmental structure. Even an EPA posting for a Congressional
Liaison Specialist in the Office of Congressional and
Intergovernmental Relations (EPA’s point of contact for Congress
and state and local governments) mentions only skills working with
congressional staff, rather than, say, knowledge of state-federal
75
relations or general governmental structure. The job postings are
only suggestive, but they indicate that the agency’s focus is far more
on its specialized mission than on broader issues of the distribution of
power among different levels of the government.
Second, an agency may face particular disincentives to thorough
consideration of abstract federalism values. Fully engaging a primary
abstract value of federalism—the value of states serving as
76
“laboratories of democracy” —requires an agency to acknowledge,
either implicitly or explicitly, that its own decision and
implementation plans may be incomplete, flawed, or at best not fully
informed. Professors Galle and Seidenfeld argue that agencies are
77
aware of “problems with all existing regulatory paradigms.” This
could presumably include shortcomings in federal standards or their
prospects for implementation.
Others have commented, however, on an agency’s tendency not
to thoroughly revisit a proposal which it has developed in a notice of

Preemption—Notice of Waiver Decision and Within the Scope Determinations, 64 Fed. Reg.
42,689, 42,690 (Aug. 5, 1999) (“CARB has continually demonstrated the existence of compelling
and extraordinary conditions justifying the need for its own motor vehicle pollution control
program, which includes the subject standards and procedures. No information has been
submitted to demonstrate that California no longer has [such] a compelling and extraordinary
need . . . .”).
74. E.g., USAJobs, EPA Supervisory Environmental Program Analyst posting,
http://jobsearch.usajobs.opm.gov/getjob.asp?JobID=71190618@brd=387...rt=rv&vw=b&Logo=0
&FedPub=Y&lid=316&FedEmp=N&ss=0&TabNum=3&rc= (last visited May 31, 2008) (copy
on file with author).
75. The posting does not mention knowledge of state-federal relations or general
governmental structure.
76. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(“It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its
citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without
risk to the rest of the country.”).
77. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1977.
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proposed rulemaking. Similarly, an agency’s failure to fully value
alternative regulatory strategies does not seem all that surprising if
the agency has already committed to a different policy approach.
For example, in his letter to Governor Schwarzenegger
announcing the waiver denial, Administrator Johnson stresses not
only the statutory grounds for the waiver denial, but also the
substantive content of the preferred national policy:
Congress has recognized the need for very aggressive yet technical
feasible national standards to address greenhouse gases and energy
security by passing the Energy Independence and Security Act. Just
today the President signed these national standards into law,
providing environmental benefits and economic certainty for
Californians and all Americans. I strongly support this national
79
approach . . . .

Conceivably, discussing California’s pioneering efforts in
developing strict greenhouse gas automotive emissions standards
might have required some implicit acknowledgment from EPA that
the proposed national solution to global warming might be
incomplete or inadequate.
Professors Galle and Seidenfeld suggest that enhanced judicial
review might help prompt agencies to more fully consider these
80
abstract federalism concerns. In my view, however, such enhanced
judicial review cannot take place without Congress enacting a statute
that guides agencies on when to interpret statutes to preempt state
law and that thus gives courts criteria with which to review agency
interpretations. Despite Galle and Seidenfeld’s arguments, judges are
highly unlikely simply to import into a “hard look” analysis factors
that are not anchored in an authorizing statute itself. They typically
look to the underlying statute as the source of the relevant factors
81
that an agency must examine. Galle and Seidenfeld also mention

78. E.g., Stephanie Stern, Cognitive Consistency: Theory Maintenance and Administrative
Rulemaking, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 589, 591 (2002) (“After agency members have devoted months,
or even years, to preparing a proposed rule and made highly visible public commitments
endorsing that proposal, the attitude maintenance bias suggests suboptimal processing of later
public inputs.”).
79. Letter from Stephen Johnson, EPA Administrator, to Arnold Schwarzenegger,
Governor of Cal., supra note 41, at 1–2.
80. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 2012–13.
81. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 471 n.4 (2001) (refusing
to allow an agency to consider cost when the statute did not mention it). See generally
Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 3, at 793–94.
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Executive Order 13,132 on federalism as a possible source of relevant
82
values. That executive order, however, is explicitly unenforceable;
noncompliance with it thus cannot serve as the basis for judicial
83
review of an agency action. Congressional action is clearly required
here. Further, rather than prompting better consideration of
federalism issues, current judicial review of agency action may
actually serve to deter agencies from fully considering them. An
agency that chooses a particular implementation path must defend its
84
decision as fully reasoned to survive “hard look review.”
Acknowledging that states may have something significant and
valuable to add to regulatory approaches, however, is not altogether
consistent with an agency fully defending its own decision as the best
option. Under some circumstances, fully valuing state approaches
might undermine the agency’s position that its decision is well
reasoned. An agency could, in theory, value states as “laboratories,”
while still defending its own (perhaps preliminary) choice as well
reasoned. Nonetheless, an agency is not likely to favor such a
strategy. When an agency is required to consider alternatives to a
particular decision, such as under the National Environment Policy
Act or other statutes, the information on alternatives the agency has
developed arguably can prompt more litigation on whether the
85
agency has fully considered an alternative or made the right choice.
Though agencies do generally win these lawsuits, the prospect of
more litigation may discourage an agency from meaningfully
considering the value of divergent state policy alternatives.
The incentive from judicial review, of course, does not apply to
Congress. Professors Galle and Seidenfeld argue that Congress, too,
82. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1983 n.2ll.
83. Exec. Order No. 13,132 § 11, 3 C.F.R. 206, 211 (2000), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(2006).
84. See, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29
(1983) (applying arbitrary and capricious standard to require agency to provide reasoned
analysis of policy choice).
85. See, e.g., Nevada Land Action Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Service, 8 F.3d 713 (9th Cir. 1993)
(denying a challenge to agency action for failure to justify chosen land management alternative
in comparison to others considered); Md. Wildlife Fed’n v. Dole, 747 F.2d 229 (4th Cir. 1984)
(dismissing a challenge to failure to adequately consider highway alternatives under NEPA),
vacated sub. nom, Md. Wildlife Fed’n v. Lewis, 22 ERC 1910 (4th Cir. 1985) (No. 83-1429);
United States v. Bell Petroleum Servs., 734 F. Supp. 771 (W.D. Tex. 1990) (ruling on a challenge
to agency’s decision to install a drinking water system, rather than taking no action or supplying
bottled water under CERCLA); see also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n, 463 U.S. 29 (applying
arbitrary and capricious standard to require agency to provide a reasoned analysis of its policy
choice).
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faces some unique disincentives to fully considering state interests.
Citing my work, they argue that “[s]tate lobbying in favor of general
86
state prerogatives typically is weak as a result of free rider effects.”
To clarify matters somewhat, lobbying of this sort is more often
undertaken by the multiple organizations that represent states as a
whole. These include national organizations such as the National
Governors’ Association or the National Conference of State
87
Legislatures. Contrary to Galle and Seidenfeld’s suggestion, these
organizations thus are likely to fully value general state prerogatives.
As I have argued in earlier work, however, an individual state
congressional delegation may not fully value broader federalism
interests such as the value of experimentation, because those values
accrue to the nation as a whole, not only to the state the delegation
represents. On the other hand, individual state delegations in
Congress may have a particular interest in valuing local interests—for
example, the Michigan delegation is known for voting against
measures that would harm the automobile industry and local
employment. This may devolve into the pathology of trying to export
88
costs of a regulatory scheme from one region to another. (For
example, one could imagine the California delegation pressing for
improved fuel efficiency standards, conceivably disproportionately
impacting Michigan, but perhaps resisting sizeable fuel tax increases.)
And indeed, I have argued that if incentives created by political
structure are important, the EPA, as an executive branch agency that
reports to the nationally elected chief executive, may be in a better
position than Congress to fully appreciate federalism benefits that
89
accrue nationally.
What the California waiver example suggests, however, is that
despite Congress’s fewer procedural demands and the mixed political
incentives to fully consider state autonomy, the EPA faces unique

86. Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1965.
87. For example, the National Conference of State Legislatures maintains the “Preemption
Monitor” webpage. Law and Criminal Justice, Preemption Monitor, http://www.
ncsl.org/standcomm/sclaw/PreemptionMonitor_Index.htm (last visited May 31, 2008); see also
Nat’l Governors Ass’n, Importance of Federalism, http://www.nga.org/portal/site/nga/menuitem.
5cd31a89efe1f1e122d81fa6501010a0/?vgnextoid=817486c0f1c61010VgnVCM1000001a01010aRC
RD (last visited May 31, 2008).
88. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1966; Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against
Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legislative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV.
1, 26–27 (2007).
89. Mendelson, Chevron and Preemption, supra note 3, at 769–73.
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constraints that may undermine its ability to fully consider
“federalism values” in its discussions on preemption.
If Congress were to provide agencies with clear guidance about
how to evaluate preemption claims, that might prompt greater
development of institutional competence on these federalism values.
Such legislation also might provide more guidance for courts
reviewing agency interpretations for consistency with the law and
under the APA’s arbitrary and capricious standard. That might
facilitate greater accountability of the sort Professors Galle and
Seidenfeld envision.
Absent such legislative action, however, what is the best
approach? Courts should not afford Chevron deference to agency
preemption interpretations. At most, the interpretations should
receive Skidmore deference—granted if the court finds the agency
interpretation “persuasive.” Under Skidmore, a court evaluating an
agency interpretation could examine the ‘“thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier
and later pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power
90
to persuade, if lacking power to control.’” Such an approach would
allow a court to pay heed to an agency’s relevant expertise, such as on
the difficulty of complying with multiple standards or the extent to
which state law might undermine an important federal goal. At the
same time, it would permit a court to disregard an agency’s
conclusions if, for example, it failed to take important federalism
issues into account in a preemption decision. If an agency’s
interpretation is completely unpersuasive and thus receives little
deference from a reviewing court, the court thus will rely primarily on
its own reading of the statutory language. Congress can respond to
the court’s reading of the language with clarification or greater
specificity. Professors Galle and Seidenfeld worry that a judicial
mistake on preemption may be difficult to correct because of the
91
obstacles to enacting legislation. It is worth noting, however, that if
the administrative agency disagrees with the judicial reading, the
agency can join other interested parties in seeking a statutory
amendment. This is likely to be a powerful combination.

90. Id. at 797–98 (quoting Skidmore v. Swift, 323 U.S. 134, 140 (1944)).
91. See Galle & Seidenfeld, supra note 1, at 1984.
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CONCLUSION
Professors Galle and Seidenfeld are surely correct that neither an
administrative agency nor Congress faces a perfect set of political
incentives to fully consider the values of state autonomy. They fail to
recognize, however, distinct limitations on agency capacity to
examine state law preemption questions. The California waiver case
study suggests that despite an advantageous procedural setting, an
agency’s deliberation on preemption still may be impaired by a
relative lack of expertise and the need for the agency to justify its own
preferred policy. An agency thus may not adequately consider
important federalism values. In sum, Congress and the judiciary
currently appear to be more promising places in which to locate
difficult questions of state law preemption.

